Comment & Debate
Kosovo is likely to declare and achieve independence in 2008. Kosovo’s modern day quest for independence stems from its 1999 war with Serbia, in which Serbian forces, under the command of Slobodan Milosevic, enterred Kosovo with the intent to perform ethnic cleansing. The United States and NATO launched in 1999 intervening air-strikes to drive back Serbian forces and successfully end the conflict.
After the war ended, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244 that placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration (UNMIK) and authorized KFOR, a NATO-led peacekeeping force of 16,000 to remain in Kosovo. Since then, multiple instances of ethnic violence have occurred between Albanians and Serbs, the worst of which was seen in 2004. All of this has renewed calls within Kosovo for independence. In early 2007, a U.N. special envoy proposed that Kosovo declare independence under the close stewardship of the EU, with security and cultural guarantees for its Serbian minority. The Bush administration and most of Europe back the plan, but Moscow has rejected it, creating significant uncertainty regarding the outcome of the movement toward independence. With the passing in December, 2007 of an international deadline to broker a deal between Serbia and Kosovo, many think that Kosovo will declare independence soon.
The debate over Kosovo independence revolves around numerous questions: 1. Does Kosovo have a right to independence? 2. Would independence lead to conflict with Serbia or ethnic Serbians inside Kosovo? 3. Would independence be a force for stability or instability in the region and internationally? 4. Would the quest for Kosovar independence strain relations between Russia and the West? 5. Will Kosovo’s move to independence gain the backing of the United States and the EU? 6. Would an independent Kosovo be a viable state? As Kosovo has come closer to independence in 2007 and 2008, the pro and con responses to these questions have become lively around the world, and the fate of Kosovo remains unclear.
See Wikipedia: Kosovo declaration of independence for more background.
“In the past several years, Kosovo has undergone a remarkable transformation. Most of the responsibilities of governing have been transferred from the U.N. Mission to the Provisional Government. Kosovo has a sound microeconomic foundation, as well as a tax system with few exemptions and low marginal rates. Our labor laws are among the most flexible in Europe and the government has normalized private property laws. While the judiciary and security sector still need deeper, fundamental reforms, Kosovo has by and large developed functional and effective institutions.”
Many Kosovars are extremely excited to become independent. They feel that they will take much more pride in their country and hope for its future. This will make them much more likely to work hard for its progression and independent viability.
The ethnic divisions between Serbia and Kosovo are very substantial, with Kosovo being 90% ethnic Albanian and Serbia being majority ethnic Serbian. Given the ethnic divisions and history between these two groups, the current arrangement is not viable, and will continue to render Kosovo disfunctional. An independent Kosovo would function more coherently and effectively.
that, “Kosovo has nowhere left to go other than independence. Returning to a state relationship with Serbia is anathema to the 90 per cent of the population that is ethnic Albanian, and forcing such a solution would reignite war. Any protectorate option would be seen by Kosovo Albanians as merely the buying of time at their expense. And there are no viable candidate organisations to take on the role: the UN’s political capital in Kosovo is exhausted after its five years of inadequate, stop-gap administration, and the EU is not geared or willing to take over Kosovo’s governance.”
Kosovo does not intend to “go it alone” as an independent nation, but, rather, to join with the EU. Therefore, Kosovo is not seeking “independence”, per se, but rather the opportunity to become a part of the EU, where it can certainly survive as a viable state.
Serbs do not enjoy freedom of movement, there is little decentralized power-sharing with local communities, political and legal institutions have yet to mature, political infighting is rampant, crime and corruption are high, patronage systems are deeply embedded in the clannish structure of Albanian society, poverty and economic woes persist, and all of this undermines Kosovo’s efforts to attract foreign capital. These are not good conditions for a move to independence and viability.
“Kosovo might be of similar fate [to Albania – see below] simply because the proponents of Albanian nationalism want to grant it independence yet it is unclear whether they are also willing to pay an exorbitant tribute to the Kosovo Alabanian government whose taxable base of less then 2 million people earning average of $30 per month cannot yield not 1% of required costs to run that country. Case in point is the $2 billion cost of American presence on only one-fifth of the province. Multiplied by 5 sectors that Kosovo is split into, the cost approaches $10 billion annually and even that presence is insufficient to provide complete security to the area. Factoring in the taxable base and potential revenues that Kosovo government may acquire from various kinds of legitimate enterprise, the independent Kosovo entity may cost foreign sponsors at least $5 billion annually to sustain it in addition to value-depleting activities exported out of there such as drugs, prostitution and weapons that may never be eradicated.”
The Kosovo region owes Serbia a significant amount of money for what the country has invested in Kosovo over the years. It is presumable that Kosovo would have to compensate Serbia for these investments if it were to gain independence, but the cost of this indebtedness could be more than Kosovo can bear.
North of the Ibar river, Kosovo’s serbs are largely opposed to an independent Kosovo and have threatened that they would secede. This would undermine the viability of a Kosovo state and possibly lead to violence or even war.
Any delay of independence in Kosovo would be seen as a sign of weakness in Serbia, and exploited to attempt to disunite the political factions in Kosovo that are set on a course to independence. This could lead to instability and violence.
Political parties in Serbia have all explicitly ruled out, in recent elections, the idea of starting another war over keeping Kosovo within Serbia’s boundaries. This, and the fact that an international military presence remains in Kosovo, makes the possibility of Serbian military resistance to Kosovo independence highly remote.
The potential for violence and conflict should not deter Kosovo’s people from pursuing independence. Because independence is just in Kosovo’s case, the use of violence and revolution toward those ends is also just.
The historic pacifism of the Kosovars makes it unlikely that they will act in an aggressive, unprovoked manner. This, in addition to the presence of international security forces, makes the outbreak of violence less likely.
Metrovica is a northern Kosovo city existing close to the border with Serbia. 40% of Kosovo Serbs live in and north of this city. A number of concerns surround this area in the event of a Kosovo declaration of independence. First, it is possible that the ethnic Serb policemen there will drop their Kosovo uniforms and enter Serbia, which could be taken as a major red flag on the part of Kosovo nationalists and reason for taking defensive military measures. In addition, it is possible that Serbia will, out of concern for its ethnic population in the north of Kosovo around Metrovica, invade or take measures to protect these groups. These Serbian concerns have led to some proposals to partition the area north of Metrovica away from an independent Kosovo.[1] All of these possibilities are real concerns for the outbreak of violence in the event of a declaration of Kosovo independence.
There is some speculation that Russia would militarily support Serbia in suppressing Kosovar independence.
North of the Ibar river, Kosovo’s serbs are largely opposed to an independent Kosovo and have threatened that they would secede. This would undermine the viability of a Kosovo state and possibly lead to violence or even war.
Kosovo nationalists have been eager to win the approval of EU foreign ministers on their bid for independence. Yet, many of these foreign ministers are hesitant to give their blessings out of concern for an outbreak of violence following independence.
Whenever world powers are unclear or silent about the their position in a conflict regarding sovereignty and independence, there is room for miscalculation. Serbia may calculate that the international community would stand on the sidelines if it acted to suppress Kosovar independence.
Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo have, in the past, discriminated against ethnic Serbs. The concern is that, without control from a central Serbian government, Kosovo Albanians may feel more free to discriminate against the Serbs in Kosovo.
Ethnic Albanians, composing 90% of the population of Kosovo, have a strong historic claim to an independent Kosovo. Kosovo-Albanian nationalism really began in the late 19th century, but their consistent claims to an independent Kosovo were repeatedly unfairly denied after WWI by the Great Powers who gave Kosovo to the more powerful Serbia and by Tito who denied them independence in an effort to placate Serbian desires.
Kosovars have a long history of struggling for independence, and have demonstrated a clear majority desire for independence.
Serbia performed numerous atrocities against the Kosovars in the war there in 1998 and 1999. This, and the recent denials of these atrocities, leads to the conclusion that the Serbians have foregone their any sovereign right over Kosovo. Whenever a government acts tyrannically towards a group of its people, its sovereignty over that people is put into question, and this is no exception.
Kosovo’s population is roughly 90% ethnic Albanian. This in itself makes it clear that Kosovo stands distinctly apart from Serbia.
Kosovo already acts with a large degree of autonomy. Independence would mainly formalize this autonomy, and would not be a dramatic shift from the status quo.
Kosovas does not exactly have a coherent national identity. Yet, its Albanian population is coherent and nationalistic, the Serbian Kosovars in the north generally oppose independence, and do not identify with the Kosovo Albanian desire for independence. This means that it is not quite proper to claim that there is a clear national identity in Kosovo that warrants independence; there is plenty division and opposition to independence.
“Kosovo and Metohia are considered to be the Serbs’ native and ancestral land, a land where their civilization, culture and identity evolved. The Serbian Constitution, recently adopted in a nationwide referendum, calls Kosovo an inalienable part of Serbia.”
Many break-away regions around the world, very similar to Kosovo, ahve declared independence but have not received international recognition. What makes Kosovo any different?
While it may be true that Serbians have abused Albanians in Kosovo, it may also be accurate that Kosovar Albanians have reciprocated abuse in kind. As such, Albanian Kosovars should have no special right to independence on the basis of Serbian abuses.
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