Bardo Fassbender. UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspecitve. 1997 – “At first glance, the right of veto of the permanent members of the UN Security Council indeed appears as a method of checking the legality of security council decisions. However, contrary to the usual constitutional pattern, according to which such control is excerted by an organ different from that the decisions of which are reviewed, here functions of control are meant to be performed by members of the Council. But what is more, why should, from all the council members, the major powers be best enabled to exercise such control? Is it not they who, because of their powerful status, usually drive the council toward action? It seems that smaller states, especially those who are long known for abiding by international law, would be in a better position to see to it that the Security Council observe the rules of law. In addition, it is more than doubtful whether in the past a significant number of vetoes was cast because of legal reasons. In an overwhelming number of cases, political and other non-legal considerations seem to have prevailed. Finally, a constitutional control oriented towards community goals and values would suggest qualifying a negative vote of only two or more states as a veto, so that the common interest of the community will guide the decision.”
Comment & Debate